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Caplan: Handgun Control: Constitutional or Unconstitutional - A Reply to

HANDGUN CONTROL: CONSTITUTIONAL OR
UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
-A REPLY TO MAYOR JACKSON*
DAVID

I. CAPLAN**

In a previous article' by Mayor Maynard H. Jackson of Atlanta, Georgia, a
number of statements were made which are at best questionable:
A. It is instructive to note that in the "legislative history of the second amendment ' 2 set forth in the article by Mayor Jackson, the statement made on the floor
of the first Congress by Eibridge Gerry (which had been reproduced in full in the
article by the present author, 3 and which had been reproduced in part by other
authorities4 prior to that article, clearly supporting a private individual right to
keep and bear arms) was completely omitted. Yet, Congressman Gerry's
exposition on the right to be vouchsafed by the second amendment is crucial to
understanding the underlying assumptions behind just what "right" was being
referred to in the then proposed second amendment. 5
B. The language of the second amendment contains several ideas: (1) the
militia, (2) the security of afree state, and (3) the right of the people to keep and
bear arms. 6 From the language and history of the second amendment, it seems
beyond question that the Framers of that amendment believed that "the right of
the people to keep and bear arms" would, inter alia, constitute insurance of the
continued existence of a "free State" through the "militia. '7 But just what was
"the right of the people to keep and bear arms" referred to in this amendment?
The answer to this question is the same as for all of the other constitutional rights
in the Bill of Rights: the pre-existing common law right.' And just what was this
pre-existing common law right? It was simply the right of every citizen to keep
*Editor's Note: This commentary examines an article by Mayor Maynard H. Jackson on handgun
control which appeared in a previous issue of the North Carolina Central Law Journal, cited below.
Mayor Jackson has been invited to redlv to Mr. Caolan's comments.
**Attorney and Counselor at Law, New York, N.Y., B.S. Worcester Polytechnic Institute; M.S.,
Ph.D., Purdue Univ.; LL.B. New York Univ.; Member, New York Bar. Dr. Caplan serves as
voluntary counsel to the Federation of Greater New York Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc.
1. Jackson, Handgun Control: Constitutional and Critically Needed, 8 N.C. CENT. L.J. 189
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Jackson].
2. Id. at 190 n.5.
3. Caplan, Restoring the Balance: The Second Amendment Revisited, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 3 1,
38 n.54 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Caplan].
4. See Feller & Gotting, Second Amendment: A Second Look, 61 Nw. U. L. REv. 46, 61-62
(1966); Memorandum of Dept. of Justice, Re: Federal Firearms Control and the Second A mendment, Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciar,. 90th Cong.,
Ist Sess., Anti-Crime Program, 242, 248 (1967).
5. Caplan, supra note 3, at 38-40.
6. "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people
to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I1.
7. Caplan, supra note 3, at 36-43; see also, United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939).
8. See Caplan, supra note 3, at 33 n. 16; see also, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 659 (1977)
("traditional common law concepts").
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and bear arms, with the only exception being the ban on "riding or going armed
with dangerous or (and?) unusual weapons, .. . terrifying the good people of the
land.-'9 Whatever this ban at common law means regarding the carrying of
various arms, the private keeping of arms was completely guaranteed by the
common law as an "absolute right of individuals."' 0 Indeed, in England it
required a statute" enacted in 1689 to ban any "papist or reputed papist,' 2 who
refused to take a loyalty oath against both the doctrine of transubstantiation and
the adoration of saints by the church of Rome, from keeping any arms at all
except upon 3a demonstration before the justices of the peace that such arms were
"necessary"' for the "defense of his house or person."' 4 This statute was
repealed ' 5 in 1844, thereby extending the then pre-existing 1689 English Bill of
Rights provision for the right of the "subjects which are protestant to ...have
arms" 6 to all British citizens, until subsequent British gun control laws in this
century.' 7 However, whereas in Britain the Parliament may abrogate all rights
with no opportunity of the citizen forjudicial review," the same is not true in our
nation in which the United States Supreme Court has struck down as
unconstitutional over a hundred acts of Congress, over 870 state acts, and over
95 municipal ordinances. 9
The limitation of the right of the people to keep arms solely to the organized
militia was far from the minds of the Framers of the second amendment, simply
because at the time of its framing in 1789, there was no such organized militia.
The first federal organized militia statute 20 of any kind was not enacted until
1792. To the Framers of the Bill of Rights, the term "militia" meant: "the whole
people, except a few public officers." 2' As made clear by the U.S. Supreme Court
in United States v.Miller,22 the well regulated militia comprised all able-bodied
citizens, "civilians primarily, soldiers on occasion." 23 These citizens, ordinarily
when called for service, "were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by
9. State v. Huntly, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 418, 420-21 (1843); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 149.
*144.
II. An act for the better securing the government by disarming papists and reputed papists, I W.
& M. 1, c.15 (1688).
12. Id. § I, referring to the earlier oath enacted in 1677, i.e., an act for the more effectual preserving
the King's person and government, by disabling papists from setting in either House of Parliament,
30 Car. 2, c.1 (1677).
13. Id. 4.
14. Id.
15. 7 & 8 Vict., c.102, §I (1844).
16. I W. & M. 2, c.2, §7 (1688): "The subjects which are protestants may have arms for their defence suitable to their conditions and as allowed by [common] law."
17. Notably, the British Firearms Act, 1937, I Edw. 8& I Geo. 6, c. 12 (1937),as amended bythe
Firearms, act, 1967, 16 Eliz. 2,c.80 (1967).
18. I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *160.
10. I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *121,

19. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 92-82, 92d Cong., 2d

Sess.,
20.
21.
22.
23.

189 201, 203 (Supp. 1976).
Militia Act of 1792, 33, I Stat. 271 (1792).
3 R. RUTLAND, THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 1081 (1970).
307 U.S. 174 (1939).
ki. at 179.
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themselves and of the kind in common use at the time." 24 Accordingly, the
second amendment pre-supposes the prior keeping of arms by the citizenry at
large-that is, those arms whose mere keeping does not "naturally cause a terror
to the people." 25 This was the substance and objective of the common law: "The

wisdom of the common law, which made it a crime to go armed to the terror of
26
the people, inures to our benefit today."
C. The theory presented in Mayor Jackson's article 27 that the phrase "for the
common defence" was deleted by the first Senate of the United States in 1789
merely for "a technical reason" 2 is entirely novel. A more neutral scholar, Julius
Goebel, Jr., writing for the Oliver Wendell Holmes devise series, History of the
Supreme Court of the United States, made the following point: "The Senate
refused to limit the right to bear arms by voting down the addition of the words
'for the common defense.' "29 Accordingly, Mayor Jackson's theory that the
second amendment's "people," prior to the first Senate's deletion of "for the
common defense," already was limited to "the right of the people of a
well-regulated militia" 3° is unsupported either by history or current authority. It
contradicts the entire scheme of the Bill of Rights usage of the term "people" and
purpose of guaranteeing the continuation of pre-existing common law rights of
the subjects of Great Britain which the Crown had refused to extend to the
3
colonists. '

D. Viewed in the light of the foregoing as well as its own context, the
statement of James Madison in The Federalist Papers (No. 46), as quoted in
Mayor Jackson's article, 32 was clearly and unequivocably founded upon the
explicit assumption that the "militia" meant something other than a formally organized militia by statute. Madison wrote of "a militia amounting to near half
a million citizens with arms in their hands, offered by men chosen from among
24. Id. (emphasis added). That is to say, the arms which the citizen already had the right to keep
at common law.
25. State v. Huntly, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 418, 421 (1843).
26. State v. Dawson, 272 N.C. 539, 549, 159 S.E.2d I, 11 (1968). Under this common law principle, the private possession of such new and terrifying weapons as nuclear bombs is clearly outside
the guarantees of the second amendment; the mere keeping of such weapons naturally causes terror
and alarm. The failure to make this point, not having been mentioned by the parties, may explain
contrary language in United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
948 (1976). This Warin case also repeats the error, apparently begun in United States v. Tot, 131
F.2d 261, 266 (3rd Cir. 1942), revd on othergrounds, 319 U.S. 463 (1943), of focusing solely on the
right to bear arms instead of keep arms at common law: "[W]eapon bearing was never treated as anything like an absolute right by the common law. It was regulated by statute as to time and place as
far back as the Statute of Northampton in 1328 and on many occasions since." United States v.
Wain, 530 F.2d at 107, citing, United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d at 266.
27. Jackson, supra note I, at 193.
28. Id.
29. I HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 450 (J. Goebel, Jr. ed. 1971)
(emphasis added).
30. Id.
3 1. See I B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 217 (1971) (declarations
and resolves of the First Continental Congress); Id. at 445-46 (George Mason's objections to the
proposed federal constitution, 1787).
32. Jackson, supra note 1, at 194.
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themselves." 33 In those days arms were so expensive that not all could afford
them. Yet, Madison was willing to trust this relatively large number of people with arms, the entire population of this nation then amounting to only four
million.34 In any event, Madison in The FederalistNo. 24 never dreamed that the
government in this nation would attempt to disarm its citizenry. The whole presentation of Madison, as well as all the other Framers of the Bill of Rights,
assumes prior common law keeping of arms among the populace, 35 and that our
government would continue to trust the people with arms.
E. The attempt to tie the second amendment's guarantee of "the right of the
people to keep and bear arms" to an organized militia alone, that is, to the
National Guard, suffers from several fundamental defects. First, an organized
militia of any kind depends upon statutes, but statutes cannot create or destroy
constitutional rights. If there is no statute concerning militia, does this mean that
the private individual's right to keep arms is in full force, only to be abolished by
enactment of a militia statute, and then to spring back into existence by the
repeal of such a statute? Of course not; and therein lies the defect in tying the
second amendment right of the people to the National Guard, a mere creature of
legislation.
Second, contrary to the assertion of Mayor Jackson that "the preservation of
public peace and the protection of the people against violence ...are also
constitutional duties," 36 our U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that even the
states and municipalities have no such duties, and that the Framers of the
fourteenth amendment believed that it would be unconstitutional for the
Federal Government to impose such duties upon these local governments. 37 The
problem of protection of the people with arms during riots, as was their common
law right,3 thus is acute and remains to this day. For example, in a case arising
out of a riot in New York City during 1968, a trialjudge overturned ajury verdict
in favor of a victimized shopkeeper who heeded the warning of the police to put
his firearms away and not protect his shop even when the police did not arrive as
they had promised:
[R]esponding to protect the interests of one isolated individual under
such circumstances of widespread crisis would have been impractical
and, more significantly, might have resulted in a neglect of the public at
large, to whom the duty was owed. Reasonableness demanded that the
need for special police protection and its concomitant particular
33. A. HAMILTON, J. MADISON & J. JAY, I THE FEDERALIST 327 (1901); THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at
299 (Mentor ed. 1961) (J. Madison).
34. U.S. DEP'TOF COMMERCE, I HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIALTIMES
TO 1970, at 8 (1975). One of the barriers against forming an effective militia in those days was the
reluctance and "failure to possess the stipulated arms or accoutrements" of the organized militia. See
R.H. KOHN, The Murder of the Militia System in the Aftermath of the American Revolution,
printed in MILITARY HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH
MILITARY HISTORY SYMPOSIUM, USAF ACADEMY, 1974, 110, 115 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office).
35. Accord. State v. Dawson, 272 N.C. 535, 546, 159 S.E.2d 1, 9 (1968).
36. Jackson. suora note I. at 195.
37. Monell v. Dep't of Social Services of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 673-82, 705 (1978).
38. I W. HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, ch. 28, § 14 (7th ed. 1795), citedin Caplan, supra note I,
at 34.
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allocation of resources, as well as the means selected to cope with the
greater burden of safeguarding the public welfare, be left to the
discretion of the police department. It is this concept of reasonableness
which excuses a municipality from liability when in the exercise of high
administrative judgment the overriding interest of the public requires
39
that rioting be permitted.
Accordingly, the people are completely defenseless in our modern cities against
riots unless they have their own arms as is their common law and constitutional
right.
Third, if the National Guard really is the well regulated militia of the second
amendment, then it would follow that every member of the Guard would have
the constitutional right to keep his National Guard arms at home, and that he
could own his National Guard arms. However, all this is contrary to the relevant
statute,4 1 providing that all National Guard arms are owned by the federal
government through the Secretary of the Army. In no way therefore, can the
right of the people to keep arms be reposited in our National Guard, at least not
under its present statutory scheme.
F. The question of the right to keep (as opposed to bear) a handgun may indeed be answered by some of the very same cases cited in the article4' by Mayor
Jackson himself. More specifically, under these cases, the class of arms protected
by the second amendment guaranty included the "revolver," 42 "musket....
holster pistols and carbine," 43 as well as ordinary "pistols." 44 Prior restraint on
the possession of these arms, as by licensing or bond requirements, is prohibited
in North Carolina, for example, by definitive interpretation of the constitution
of that state. 45 Therefore, the constitutional right of the citizen to keep arms extends to all arms whose mere possession does not naturally cause terror to the
46
people.
G. Although there are admittedly more modern federal decisions holding
that the second amendment guaranty does not extend to the private individual, 47
nevertheless, it must be noted that none of these cases has considered at all the
common law on the subject of keeping arms, nor the historical background on
the keeping of arms.

4

1

In this vein, moreover, it should be remembered that not

39. Bloom v. City of N.Y., 174 N.Y.L.J. 6 (1975). Interestingly, there is no liability in a municipality in New York State for "property destroyed or injured by mobs or riots." N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS
§9193 (McKinney).
40. 32 U.S.C. § 105(a) (I) (1970).
41. Jackson, supra note I, at 196 nn.43 & 44.
42. In re Brickey, 8 Idaho 597, 598, 70 P. 609, 609 (1902) (holding unconstitutional under the second amendment and the Idaho state constitution a ban on the carrying of deadly weapons).
43. English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 476 (1872).
44. State v. Kerner, 181 N.C. 574, 578, 107 S.E. 222, 225 (1921).
45. Id. at 575-76, 578-79. 107 S.E. at 223-25.
46. See notes 8, 9, 10, 25 & 26 supra and accompanying text.
47. Jackson, supra note I,at 194 n.26; but see, Moore v. City of E.Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502,
542 (1977), where a majority of the justices approved of the earlier list of individual constitutional
rights by the late Justice Harlan dissenting in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961), this list explicitly including "the right to keep and bear arms."
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too long ago it was the consensus in this nation that the "separate but equal"
doctrine was the law of the land, only to be rudely awakened by Brown v. Board
of Education 49 and its progeny. Similarly, the present day legal situation with
respect to "the right of the people to keep and bear arms" of the second amendment may well be in the same state as was the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment 50 in pre-Brown days, but with one notable distinction: Over
40 million Americans 5' actually practice the right to keep handguns, untold
numbers practice the right to keep rifles and shotguns, and still more Americans
who do not choose to own arms rely on others who do.
48. See note 26 supra.
49. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), rev'g, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
50. U.S. CONST. amend XIV states in part: "No State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
51. Jackson, supra note 1, at 198.
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